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Recent terrorist attacks in Europe were 
committed by homegrown radicals, 
mostly by loners with limited ties to the 
Islamic State, if any. Many observers 
agree that the jihadi threat is indeed 
changing, but the nature of these 
changes is often exaggerated or 
misconceived. As a result, our capacity 
to craft effective counter-terrorism 
policies is hindered, despite their urgent 
necessity. This policy brief seeks 
therefore to better understand the key 
elements and drivers of the new jihadi 
threat in Europe – and indeed to 
determine what is actually new about it – 
while offering some recommendations. 
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Media reports often emphasise the profile of 
these terrorists as something new. Yet, a 
recent study found that 73% of the attacks in 
Europe and North America, over the past 
three years, were committed by homegrown 
terrorists, and another 14% involved citizens 
from neighbouring countries.1 These findings 
confirmed those from earlier studies. Over the 
past decades, the vast majority of attacks in 
Europe and North America have been 
committed by “homegrown” terrorists.2 Thus, 
nothing new. 
 
This does not mean that the threat is not 
changing, however. In this policy brief, I argue 
that the jihadi threat in Europe is indeed 
entering a new phase, even if there is much 
continuity with previous jihadi waves. I start 
by comparing the “new” threat of homegrown 
terrorists with that of “foreign terrorist 
fighters”, highlighting similarities and 
differences between these two categories. 
Then, I explain how the evolution of the jihadi 
threat is the result of strategic thinking by 
ISIS‟ leadership, changing circumstances, and 
opportunity. Finally, I draw the contours of 
the new jihadi threat in Europe and offer some 
recommendations in order to cope with it. 
 
HTF VS. FTF  
Since 2012, Western intelligence services had 
feared that young Europeans travelling to Syria 
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Oussama Zariouh, the perpetrator of the failed 
terrorist attack in Brussels central station on 
the 20th June has become the new face of jihad 
in Europe. All we know at this stage of the 
investigation, is that he acted alone without 
direct orders or links to the Islamic State (ISIS) 
– although claiming to act on their behalf. He 
was a “homegrown” terrorist who arrived in 
Belgium from Morocco in 2002, at the age of 
twenty. A loner and homegrown, that was also 
the profile of the perpetrator of the failed 
attack on the Champs-Elysées in Paris, earlier 
in June, while the attackers in London and 
Manchester were equally homegrown. 
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and Iraq would return home and pose a 
security threat. Now, security officials confess 
that what worries them most is unidentified 
homegrown radicals, initiating a killing spree 
with an everyday weapon, such as a knife or a 
car – or even homemade explosives, such as in 
Brussels recently.3 The threat perception 
across Europe is arguably sliding from a focus 
on “foreign terrorist fighters” (FTF) to an 
obsession with “homegrown terrorist fighters” 
(HTF). US scholar Brian Jenkins describes this 
evolution in the following manner: until just 
recently, youngsters wanted to be part of a 
jihadi group which ordered them to kill; now, 
they seek to kill in order to be part of the 
jihad, even if posthumously.4  
 
Such evolution calls for the development of 
new counter-terrorism measures, and the 
adjustment of existing ones. The problem is, 
however, the amount of confusion around the 
concepts of HTF/FTF, as well as what, 
precisely, they mean and encompass. For 
instance, the Belgian joint intelligence database 
on FTF includes five categories: individuals in 
Syria/Iraq; those on their way to Syria/Iraq; 
individuals that have come back (the returnees); 
those who have failed to reach Syria/Iraq (the 
“frustrated of the jihad”); and those who have 
the propensity to travel. But how much 
difference is there really between individuals in 
the two latter categories (who did not travel) 
and a HTF (for which a new category was 
created in the Belgian database last April)? 
What actually defines a HTF? What type of 
behavior or action justifies inclusion in that 
precise category? And, more fundamentally, 
how do we identify and stop them? 
 
All these questions are not asked in order to, 
solely, feed brilliant academic debates. They, 
also, have major policy relevance. Many legal 
and operational counter-terrorism measures 
implemented over the past years in Europe 
targeted specifically (potential) FTF, and more 
measures will likely be adopted in the future to 
cope with (potential) HTF. Yet, here‟s the 
 tricky question: how is one able to design 
effective measures, and evaluate them, with 
only a partial understanding of the problem? 
This is why it is so crucial to understand the 
differences, similarities and interplay between 
FTF and HTF.  
 
Travel (or the absence thereof) is, of course, 
the main distinction between foreign and 
homegrown fighters. As nuanced above, 
however, some FTF have not actually been 
able to travel, while some HTF may in fact 
have been radicalised on the occasion of a trip 
abroad. There is, thus, a vast grey zone 
between HTF and FTF which cannot be 
ignored, touching to the very essence of the 
FTF category, i.e. the notion of travel.  
 
Another issue of contention is the level of risk. 
FTF are usually considered to be more 
dangerous, as they have been further 
radicalised ideologically and have received 
military training, or perhaps even participated 
in military operations and violent actions. This 
makes them more “professional” terrorists. 
They may also have developed particular skills 
or competences that could be used in a 
terrorist plot at home, such as bomb-making. 
Homegrown terrorists are, by contrast, more 
often labelled as “amateurs”. Without specific 
training, they are more likely to commit 
mistakes while planning an attack, possibly 
leading to the plot‟s failure. Some recent 
attacks in Europe were strikingly amateurish. A 
number of studies suggest that attacks by 
homegrown terrorists are more likely to fail or 
to have little impact, whereas plots involving 
foreign fighters are more likely to succeed, 
with a higher degree of sophistication.5 There 
are notable exceptions, however. For instance, 
Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, a Tunisian-born 
who had lived in France for more than 10 
years, killed 86 persons, whilst injuring more 
than 400, in Nice in July 2016.  
 
Next to their skills and commitment, FTF are 
also traditionally perceived as more connected 
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to a structured terrorist organisation or 
network. Indeed, foreign fighters have 
established very formal ties with the terrorist 
group they joined, and with its leadership. 
Some FTF have been sent back to Europe 
with a clear mandate to conduct operations in 
the name of the Islamic State. By contrast, 
homegrown terrorists are often described as 
“lone wolves”, self-radicalised on the internet, 
with absolutely no link with any member of a 
terror group. Yet, these clear-cut distinctions 
do not reflect the wide scope of ties that can 
exist between a radicalised individual and a 
group. Not every HTF is a “lone wolf”. Some 
have established physical ties with members of 
a terrorist organisation in Europe, or virtual 
ones via internet or social media. A recent 
study highlighted the role the Islamic State‟s 
so-called “virtual planners”, who recruit young 
Europeans via the internet and entice them to 
mount an attack, offering tactical and technical 
guidance to anyone interested.6 Moreover, not 
every returnee is a ticking bomb. Some were 
ready to fight the defensive jihad in Syria, but 
not to strike their homeland; some deserted 
ISIS, leaving terrorism behind out of 
disillusion, more notably. Some foreign fighters 
may also honestly seek redemption and 
reintegration into the society, before falling 
back into violent extremism years later – would 
that still be considered as a case of FTF, or 
HTF? Eventually, the FTF/HTF categories tell 
us less than we think they do about the degree 
of autonomy of an individual from a terrorist 
organisation.  
 
Beyond all of the differences, there is also one 
undeniable similarity: FTF and HTF are all 
homegrown. All European foreign fighters 
are…Europeans (citizens or residents), who 
mostly radicalised in Europe. Of course, this 
can hide different realities, different senses of 
“belonging”. Some (potential) terrorists were 
born and raised in Europe, others arrived at an 
early age, whereas others arrived after their 
adolescence (like Oussama Zariouh or 
Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel). This makes any 
generalisation on their profile or trajectory 
almost impossible. Nevertheless, this 
observation is fundamental, because it indicates 
that the roots of the current threat, and its 
solutions, are to be found domestically in the 
first place.  
 
Finally, it is crucial to recognize that FTF and 
HTF are not hermetic groups. They interact in 
many ways. Foreign fighters can play a major 
role in radicalising and recruiting new 
members, from Syria (through the internet, as 
in the case of virtual planners) or after their 
return home (including in prison, where a 
number of returnees are engaged in active 
proselytism). Foreign fighters have a charisma 
that gives them magnetic power. They can also 
share their skills and know-how with 
inexperienced fighters. The so-called “veteran 
effect” has been well-documented.7 Moreover, 
FTF and HTF can operate together in a same 
cell, or network. That was the case, for 
instance, of the network behind the Paris 
(November 2015) and Brussels (March 2016) 
attacks, where “veterans” Abdelhamid 
Abaaoud and Najim Laachraoui conspired with 
Salah Abdeslam and Khalid el-Bakraoui, who 
never went to Syria. And there is nothing new 
there. A decade earlier, the cell that prepared 
the Madrid bombings (March 2004) also 
comprised veteran foreign fighters and 
homegrown terrorists. 
 
In short, it is very difficult to create clear-cut 
categories for wannabe terrorists. Thinking in 
terms of FTF and HTF has a logic to it, but it 
may also be counter-productive if we do not 
accept that these categories share fundamental 
similarities and overlap. FTF and HTF are, in 
fact, the two faces of the same coin; they 
belong to the same jihadi wave.8 
 
THE ARMY OF ONE 
The HTF-FTF dynamic is dependent upon the 
Islamic State‟s own strategy and, perhaps even 
more fundamentally, on circumstances and 
opportunities. First, it is important to recognise 
 4 
that terrorist organisations are adaptive. More 
than a decade ago, the al-Qaeda scholar, of 
Syrian origin, Abu Musab al-Suri argued that 
Ben Laden‟s hierarchically structured 
organisation was vulnerable following the US 
invasion of Afghanistan, since Western counter-
terrorism operations focused on targeting its 
leadership.9 In his 1,600-page book entitled The 
Call to Global Islamic Resistance, which was 
published in December 2004, al-Suri proposed 
that al-Qaeda should evolve from a central 
structure to a decentralised, leaderless movement. 
That global movement would be united by a 
shared aim and ideology rather than command, 
and would take different military forms, ranging 
from local insurgencies to small or individual 
cells comprised of veteran fighters and/or lone 
wolves which would be self-recruited, self-
radicalised and self-sustained. A doctrine that 
came to be known as the “army of one”. 
 
After initially rejecting al-Suri‟s proposed 
strategy, al-Qaeda‟s leadership eventually 
embraced it. In the 2000s, al-Qaeda opened 
franchises worldwide and sought to inspire 
homegrown terrorism in the West, notably 
through its own English-speaking glossy 
magazine called…Inspire. Anwar al-Awlaki, a 
Yemeni-American cleric, who was extremely 
popular on the internet and social media, co-
founded the magazine. A key figure in the 
evolution of the jihadi doctrine himself, he 
actively and repeatedly encouraged isolated 
actions in the West. According to some, he may 
be related to more than 30% of the jihadi plots 
in the United States between 2009 and 2016.10  
The Islamic State, like al-Qaeda before, is 
evolving towards a form of leaderless jihad. In 
fact, the evolution of the two jihadi 
organisations is strikingly similar. From a highly 
centralised, hierarchical structure, culminating 
with the proclamation of the caliphate in 2014, 
the Islamic State is quickly morphing into a 
decentralised, leaderless movement. From Asia 
to Africa, a number of regional groups have 
already pledged allegiance to ISIS, while 
autonomous cells and “lone wolves” are acting 
on its behalf in Europe, North America, 
Australia and elsewhere. The “army of one” 
had already been called upon by the group‟s 
official spokesman Abu Mohammad al-
Adnani, in September 2014, during the heyday 
of the caliphate, emphasizing once again that 
FTF and HTF are complementary categories, 
rather than surrogates. But what was only one 
option among several offered to jihadi 
candidates in 2014, has now become the 
dominant and only strategy. Jihad in Europe 
seems today more a matter of visibility than 
effectiveness; where quantity outweighs quality. 
 
The importance of certain strategists should 
not, however, be exaggerated. The evolution of 
the jihadi threat in Europe is largely dictated by 
circumstances and opportunities. 
Circumstances have fundamentally changed 
over the past couple of years. The 
accumulation of military defeats and the death 
of some senior members have forced the 
group to loosen control over its territory and 
networks. The Syrian jihad has lost its appeal, 
while the adoption of more stringent measures 
across Europe to prevent people from 
travelling to the region have largely 
contributed to the erosion of the FTF 
phenomenon. ISIS now has no other choice 
than to increasingly rely on homegrown 
fighters worldwide. For al-Suri himself, the 
leaderless jihad was a strategy of last resort, 
when all other options had failed. 
 
It should further be recognised that the Islamic 
State had a unique opportunity to shift towards 
a leaderless jihad, one that it had largely 
created for itself. Never before had any other 
jihadi group succeeded in attracting so many 
militants and followers worldwide. From this 
unprecedented pool of “sympathizers” to the 
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jihadi cause, an unprecedented number of 
homegrown terrorists could emerge. In short, 
ISIS relies more on homegrown fighters because 
it must, but also because it can. 
 
THE VIRTUAL CALIPHATE  
ISIS is losing ground, but is not dead yet. 
Possibilities exist for the group to survive and 
even re-emerge in some parts of Syria and Iraq, 
perhaps under a new name. Senior leaders could 
alternatively decide to migrate to other, more 
permissive jihadi theaters to rebuild what has 
been lost. More fundamentally, however, the 
jihadi threat in Europe will not vanish 
miraculously following the fall of the caliphate, 
or the death of its leaders.  
 
The jihadi movement will survive ISIS anyway. 
A virtual caliphate is already emerging on the ruins 
of the caliphate in the Levant. It is virtual in the 
sense that it does not require any physical 
territory. The jihadi ideology focuses on the 
conquest of vulnerable minds, not lands. It is 
also virtual for it relies on the internet and social 
media to propagate its ideas, recruit new 
militants, connect them together, and encourage 
or even guide violent actions. This is not to say 
that the jihad is about to become online-based 
only, but rather that the internet is playing a 
growing role in it. Should we still be surprised 
that the Manchester attacker (and possibly the 
Brussels one) learned how to build bombs on 
the internet? 
 
Jihadi movements rely on three constituents: the 
hard core, comprising the organisation‟s central 
leadership; a network of “veteran fighters” who 
socialised with the hard core before returning 
home to build local franchises or cells; and a 
wider militant base, encompassing the broader 
pool of “sympathizers” and potential 
“homegrown terrorist fighters”, only connected 
to the hard core by aim and ideology.11 If the 
first of these constituents seems weakened 
today, the network of fighters and the militant 
base remain unaffected. If anything, more 
foreign fighters are expected to return home in 
the coming months, while the militant base has 
stabilised at significant (and concerning) 
numbers, and is possibly still expanding. In 
Belgium, for instance, prevention workers have 
identified a growing problem of radicalisation 
and support for the jihadi ideology in 2016.12  
 
The contours of the new jihadi threat in 
Europe will therefore be determined by the 
interplay between veteran fighters, acting as 
new hubs or ringleaders; the militant base, as 
supporter and cannon fodder; and the internet, 
as facilitator and echo chamber. There is much 
similarity with al-Qaeda‟s threat in the 2000s, 
and there are, thus, also lessons to be drawn 
from previous successes and failures. The 
main, albeit fundamental difference comes 
from the fact that there are now more veteran 
fighters than ever before, a broader and 
growing militant base, and a more omnipresent 
internet. 
 
The implications of this new threat for our 
counter-terrorism approach are numerous, but 
I focus on four main ones. First, returnees are 
likely to play a key role in the recruiting and 
training of the next jihadi wave. It is therefore 
imperative to monitor them very closely, and 
seek to limit their influence as much as 
possible. That work starts imperatively in 
prison, where a number of them are already 
detained or heading in that direction. Prisons 
have always been an incubator for 
radicalisation and violence, but there are many 
indications that the problem is growing out of 
proportion. Some recruiters seem to see jail as 
“jihadi universities”, while programmes 
focusing on counter-radicalisation, de-
radicalisation or disengagement remain 
underdeveloped in prison. Mentoring, as well 
as rehabilitation and reintegration programmes, 
should also be imperatively implemented. 
Overall, there is still a need for a thorough 
response to returning fighters. 
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Second, if homegrown terrorism is considered a 
key threat, then more efforts should be invested 
in prevention work. While the fall of the 
caliphate has affected the attractive power of the 
jihadi adventure (the main “pull factor”), the 
root causes of radicalisation (the so-called “push 
factors”) remain largely unaddressed in our 
Western societies. As long as we do not work on 
these “push factors” and on the conducive 
environment to violent extremism, there will be 
a pool of candidates available to jihadi recruiters. 
An effective counter-terrorism response should 
therefore focus on all prevention aspects: 
primary prevention (focusing on the whole 
population), secondary prevention (focusing on 
vulnerable individuals and communities), and 
tertiary prevention (focusing on individuals 
already in the process of radicalisation). A 
consistent approach to the issue of HTF is 
needed, which can only be a comprehensive one. 
There is still a tendency to frame our counter-
terrorism response in overly security terms. 
While the strengthening of security apparatus is 
required in some countries, such as Belgium, 
that neglected it for too long, that approach is 
only part of the answer. You cannot face an 
“army of one” with just one army. Hard security 
only constitutes the last line of defense against 
violent extremism.  
 
Third, since the internet is playing a growing role 
in the virtual caliphate, our counter-terrorism  
response should also increasingly be focused 
online. While a lot of efforts have been 
developed in order to take online jihadi contents 
down, more can still be done in partnership with  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
internet companies. Counter-messaging and 
alternative messaging campaigns should also 
be promoted. If radicalisation, recruitment and 
training increasingly take place on the web, 
intelligence services must also significantly 
strengthen their online presence.  
 
Finally, while terrorism and radicalisation must, 
first and foremost, be addressed domestically, 
we should not entirely close our eyes on the 
international dimension of this challenge. On 
the one hand, more cooperation is required at 
the European and global levels to address a 
phenomenon that is indeed transnational. Each 
country dealing with this unprecedented 
challenge is learning by doing. More exchanges 
of good practices should therefore be 
encouraged and facilitated. On the other hand, 
we should keep in mind that the jihadi 
movement will likely seek to upgrade itself 
again in more hospitable territories, in the 
Middle East or elsewhere. If circumstances 
allow, there is no doubt that a new hard core 
structure will seek to emerge in order to, once 
again, upgrade the virtual caliphate into a 
physical one. Preventing this, should also be 
our priority. 
 
Thomas Renard is a Senior Research 
Fellow at the Egmont Institute and an 
Adjunct Professor at the Vesalius College, 
Brussels. The author is grateful to Rik 
Coolsaet and Toria Ficette for their 
invaluable comments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
nooit een constante. De vraag is of in de 
huidige context ons land opteert voor een 
standvastig defensiebeleid of net niet.   
 
HET EUROPESE KADER  
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